Summary of False Evidence Err by Appeal Court and Substantial Impact Against the Interest of Justice.
The Appeal Panel misunderstood the significant impact that knowingly presenting false data and testimony through four key witnesses had on the integrity of the trial. The panel relied on a deliberate misrepresentation in the government’s response to excuse the widespread use of false data and testimony, which inflated losses by over $28 million, through four key witnesses. Reynolds’ system directly tracked these commissions and were explicitly described to the jury as being included in the key data (refer to 101i and Summary Chart 232). The government misled this panel regarding its knowledge of the specifically tracked omitted commissions (gift certificates and funds transfers). Reynolds was directly questioned about whether his system tracked them, which he affirmed (doc 498 #4220 4221). The government explicitly addresses “other” spreadsheets he produced that included those types of commission transactions. (id)
Q. Let me ask you this, if you recall: Do you recall whether I2G had a gift — this has to do with one of the charts you were shown and one of the spreadsheets — whether I2G had a gift certificate function within the e-wallet where one distributor who had commissions built up could request a gift certificate and a number was issued and the distributor could use the gift card to pay for a new enrollee?
A. The system does include that functionality. I honestly don’t remember if they had it turned on or not, but it’s perfectly conceivable. There were a lot of financial transfers — or transactions that dealt with what we call funds transfers, and that’s how a gift certificate is paid for. So I would guess that it was probably turned on and they were using that. The gift certificate could be used for anything.
Reynolds gave the same false testimony when describing 101F that it included all commissions earned by i2G distributors, when it “filtered out” the same 28 million in commissions as 101i . The government had a duty to correct the false testimony. ( #498 4131)
Q. And what would be your best description of what those are?
A. That’s the total of all the commission types that that (False Statement) #498 #4131
person earned for that period. So this would be like your check
at the top, and then all the detail that we looked at in the
other spreadsheet, that would be like your check stub at the
bottom. And then that’s a total of everything.
The panel did not comprehend that exculpatory data (7240) proved that over $38 million in commissions paid to I2G distributors was withheld from Hosseinipour, a distributor without access to company data. Deceptive tactics were used to discredit this data based on false statements attributed to Reynolds about its reliability. However, Reynolds affirmed the data’s reliability in his affidavit.
The government knowingly “filtered out” $28 million in commission payments from this data to create new data one week before the trial. (101i) The “filtered commissions,” which were directly tracked, were misrepresented to be “included” in the critical Participant Gain/Loss data (refer to 101i and Summary Chart 232) used throughout the trial. These commissions were hidden through the “filtering” and could not be discovered during the trial. The significance is that non-existent victims and 28 million dollars in losses were manufactured.
The impact, if unclear, was that it falsified all the data and related testimony of four key witnesses and ten distributor witnesses where the data was used. The data also proves that the loss representations of non-testifying “alleged victims” in jury instructions were false and dramatically inflated. Commission payments of over $770,000 to just four of the non-testifying “alleged victims” were concealed from the jury. Moreover, the false Gain/Loss (101i Summary chart 232) evidence was relied upon and impacted the conclusions drawn for every argument Hosseinipour presented. The prejudice could not be clear.-
Given the severity of what can only be described as a fraud upon the Court, the interest of justice demands a rehearing of the evidence using the proper standard.
(Go into False Standard)
The conspiracy charge against Hosseinipour, a mere independent distributor, assumed that she knowingly participated in a “34 million dollar” pyramid scheme with a 97% loss rate. However, the data proves that 38 million in commission payments were made to I2G distributors, disproving the basis of the offense charged. The central premise regarding losses needed for a scheme to defraud is invalid.
Additionally, the false testimony from four key witnesses and inaccurate I2G data across all spreadsheets and exhibits necessitates a retrial in the interest of justice.OR
This case highlights the dangers of data manipulation used to present evidence in a way that unfairly favors the government. Every claim relied on data provided by four key witnesses. The losses and victims outlined in 101i and Summary chart 232 were “manufactured” through omissions or manipulations of data. Both the government and Jerry Reynolds acknowledged that the data was “filtered.” The “filtered” claims for alleged victims exceed $28 million, which drastically inflated the representation of losses while minimizing gains. This compromised the integrity of the entire trial, as it falsified every piece of evidence and related testimony.
Exculpatory data showing 38 million in commission payments was purposefully hidden from the jury by filtering out 28 million in commission payments represented to be included in the data. The panel recognized that the government inflated losses but relied on a misrepresented and non-related statement in the government’s response to excuse 28 million in inflated losses represented in key data through four key witnesses, used to judge the offense. Therefore, the entire trial was a fraud upon the Court. The appeal panel could not view any argument in the light most favorable to the government when the foundation of every argument was tainted by the implicit bias and false assumptions created from false evidence.
Moreover, Hosseinipour’s knowing participation in a scheme to defraud depended on proof that she was deceiving people through a scheme, resulting in their losing money, rather than proof that she was helping fellow distributors join a viable business opportunity in which they were earning significant commissions, as validated by over $38 million in verifiable commissions paid to distributors.
Thus, one can not conclude that Hosseinipour knowingly joined a criminal conspiracy to defraud others or that she earned the majority of the total commissions. The commissions that Hosseinipour received were not proof of people being defrauded but proof of people experiencing success within her team. Her earned commission with her husband represented only 2.6% of the total paid commission.
Furthermore, the prosecution knew this, as they “filtered” the exculpatory commission data and failed to inform the Court or the defense about the excluded commissions. Instead, they presented an entire trial based on the false testimony of four key witnesses, which misrepresented the commissions they claimed were included in their critical data.
Supreme Court precedent regarding the use of false evidence unequivocally overrides an appellate court’s obligation to view evidence in the most favorable light for the prosecution when false evidence is proven, which compromised the integrity of the trial. When the appellate court relies on this same false evidence and testimony to shape its opinion and dismiss the defendant’s arguments, it disregards well-established precedent from both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit. This situation demands an urgent rehearing to ensure that the case is examined through the correct lens.
The most recent 2025 US Supreme Court case that illustrates the scenario where an appeals court based its review of evidence on the light most favorable to the prosecution, but this review is invalidated due to reliance on false evidence, is Glossip v. Oklahoma.
Specifically, in Glossip v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court noted that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ (OCCA) decision failed to consider that the prosecution knowingly relied on false evidence, impacting the verdict’s reliability.
More broadly, the Supreme Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This principle, rooted in cases like Napue v. Illinois, dictates that a new trial is necessary if the false testimony could have, in any reasonable likelihood, affected the jury’s judgment.
While reviewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution is a standard applied by appellate courts when assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, it is not a license to overlook or validate a conviction based on evidence proven to be false. Cases like Brady v. Maryland further expand on the prosecution’s obligations to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, including evidence that could impeach the credibility of witnesses, which, if withheld, can violate due process.
Therefore, even when applying the “light most favorable to the prosecution” standard, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a conviction cannot stand if it is based on evidence that the prosecution knew to be false and was material to the outcome of the trial.
When evidence to prove an offense is demonstrably false, an automatic new trial is warranted. The conspiracy surrounding an alleged $34 million pyramid scheme was proven through false data and testimony. Therefore, the Appeal Court based its conclusions on the same false data and testimony. Therefore, a standard of review that favors the government can not apply. Such a standard would only reinforce the false testimony that ultimately denied the defendant a fair trial.
An en banc request for rehearing is an extraordinary measure. However, the denial of due process by convicting a defendant based on false evidence contradicts the principles of justice. In these exceptional circumstances, a rehearing is demanded in the interest of justice to review the evidence with new consideration of the false evidence’s impact on Hosseinipour’s due process rights and relation to the panel’s conclusions.
When an appellate court reviews a case where false evidence is proven, its focus shifts from simply considering the evidence in the most favorable light for the prosecution to addressing the due process violation created by that false evidence. This shift means the appellate court will concentrate on whether the use of false evidence harmed the defendant’s right to a fair trial, which could result in a reversal of the conviction or a new trial. These principles are directly applicable in the cases of Napue v. Illinois, Maryland V Brady, and Mooney, Miller V Pate, Glossip V Oklahoma
The reliance on false evidence has become a matter of national importance, highlighted by a growing distrust of government agencies. This sentiment is echoed by top officials within the Justice Department, including President Donald Trump, Attorney General Pam Bondi, and FBI Director Cash Patel, among others. This distrust has been fueled by high-profile cases that reveal the politicization and weaponization of the Justice Department, as well as sophisticated disinformation campaigns that utilize false evidence. This situation highlights the urgent need to restore integrity and public trust in the justice system by rejecting cases based on the knowing use false evidence.
Background
The government acknowledged through its responses that the critical loss of data represented by four key witnesses was false and inflated. It admitted to omitting key commissions from its key loss data. The untracked commissions equaled millions paid to Syn and his team members. However, 28 million in paid commission, tracked by Reynold’s system, were deliberately“filtering” out of its key loss data, which claimed to include this data. These omissions from (7241) to form the government’s key loss data (101i) exceeded $28 million. These claimed losses were central to the conspiracy to commit fraud offenses. The data source used to filter out these commissions (7241) included $38 million in commission payments to i2g distributors. These “gains” were stripped out of the data and misrepresented as losses through the testimony of four key witnesses. The prejudice is clear and unmistakable.
On June 26, 2025, a three-judge panel of the 6th Circuit issued a decision that denied Hosseinipour’s arguments. The panel vacated the district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial, which was based on issues recognized by six of the Sixth Circuit judges, including her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and the court’s denial being based on a Frye hearing that did not occur.
The false evidence influenced the opinions issued by the 6th Circuit. The panel misunderstood the significance of the false testimony. It relied on a direct misrepresentation in the government’s response that argued the jury could reasonably conclude that millions of dollars in “checks” outside the system were not accounted for. However, this statement was irrelevant to the 28 million dollars in omitted commissions from (7241) to create 101i, which were directly tracked by the Reynolds system. Furthermore, the jury was explicitly informed that these were included in the data through four key witnesses.
The government admitted to “filtering” commission data from the exculpatory data, which showed $38 million in commission payments to I2G distributors. (7240) This panel accepted that commissions were “filtered” and inflated. The exculpatory data (7240) was accepted into these proceedings through government validations and the failure to rebut Hosseinipour’s factual assertions regarding false and “filtered” data. Nor does the government or the 6th Circuit panel challenge the data’s validity or introduction. Therefore, it is valid evidence in the appeal proceeding.
The Appeal Court failed to recognize the significant impact of the false data and testimony from four key witnesses, and in conjunction with twelve other witnesses on the integrity of the trial. The panel opinion was based on a deliberate misrepresentation presented to this Court and an assumption that there was any way for Hosseinipour’s ineffective counsel to recognize that 28 million dollars was “filtered” out of the data, which hid these omissions and challenged the evidence that was never disclosed.The panel relied upon Reynolds’s singular, completely irrelevant, and misrepresented statement, in which he confirmed that his system would not track “external” commissions. He specified that checks paid outside of the system would logically not be tracked. The government knowingly misled this Court by claiming that this statement encompassed the acknowledged “filtered” commissions, which exceeded $28 million, omitted from its key loss evidence, 101. However, the government knew that his system specifically tracked these “internal” commissions and were explicitly described to the jury as part of the data misrepresented by four witnesses. (101i Total Participant Gains and Losses)
In other words, the government misrepresented to this Court through Reynolds’ unrelated statement that the jury was already informed that not all commissions were included in 101i. This obscured the significant fact that $28 million in commissions, which were tracked by Reynold’s system and explicitly presented to the jury as included in the data, was already known to them. Such prosecutorial misconduct is wholly unacceptable.
The significance of $28 million in paid commissions being omitted from key data, which claimed to include these commissions, and represented through four key witnesses, cannot be overstated. It impugned the integrity of the trial and disproved the central claims of losses. Since the Appeal Decision was premised on assumptions from false evidence, a rehearing of the evidence is necessary under the proper standard of review.
Irrefutable data accepted through this proceeding (7240) proves that $38 million in commissions were paid to the i2G distributors. These findings disprove the loss claims of 38 million that formed the basis of the offense. The omitted commission payments to create 101i exceeded $28 million and were falsely represented through the testimonies of four key witnesses. The government filtered out 75% of the paid commissions. In essence, the government created victims and losses that did not exist—a fact irrefutably demonstrated by the data. (repetitive)
Three key witnesses also misidentified two years’ worth of post-i2G data as representing I2G. This spreadsheet timeframe (2015-2017) was after i2G was closed. This tainted data was not inconsequential, as it involved 4,091 XTG1 distributors and over $ 6 million in XTG1 sales. Every data claim made by the four key witnesses is provably false. It undermined the integrity of the trial, underscoring the urgent need for a rehearing of the evidence with a deeper understanding of the false testimony.
The government’s sole argument against the false data was that Hosseinipour, despite having ineffective counsel—an issue noted by six judges of the 6th Circuit—should have discovered the deception sooner and addressed it during cross-examination. However, despite the substantial ineffective issues, no attorney could have anticipated that the government would deliberately omit $28 million in commissions from the data it claimed to represent. These omissions were a deliberate act to inflate losses, which was concealed by “filtering the data.”
Nor does the Constitution forfeit a defendant’s due process rights if the false evidence is discovered “too late,” as the government argued. It clearly states that the intentional use of false evidence that results in a conviction is unacceptable under any circumstances, and it requires a new trial. (Miller v. Pate, Napue), Brady)
In Miller v. Pate, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction based on the discovery of false evidence years after the conviction, as well as the appeal decision that was influenced by the false evidence.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a criminal conviction obtained through the knowing use of false evidence or testimony by the state violates the defendant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This principle is rooted in the idea of fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings. As the Supreme Court stated in Mooney v. Holohan, deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with “rudimentary demands of justice”.
When the state’s representatives are aware that testimony or evidence presented is false, they have a duty to correct it, even if they did not solicit it.
If the false testimony or evidence “could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury”, then a new trial is required.
Hosseinipour presented substantial evidence that proved that the government withheld exculpatory data (7240), which showed $38 million in commission payments to I2G distributors. The government misled the Court by claiming that Reynolds had reported “problems” with the data, leading to a request for new data just two weeks before the trial. However, Reynolds denies making such a claim. In an affidavit, he confirmed the validity of the data and stated that the government had “filtered out” crucial commission information exceeding $28 million to construct 101i with its narrative of losses. This manipulation undermined the integrity of the trial and invalidated the core claims concerning the existence of victims and losses. (repeat but nicely worded)
Through its lack of denial, the government effectively acknowledged that three of its key witnesses seriously misidentified two years’ worth of non-I2G data as belonging to I2G in critical spreadsheets. This erroneous data was pivotal to the case, significantly affecting key statistics underpinning Dr. Keep’s analysis. Hosseinipour had no way of knowing that the I2G data had been compromised with Xtg1 data, as the dates were concealed, and Reynolds misidentified the 2015-2017 data as pertaining to I2G. He also admitted that no data concerning the dates had been verified for accuracy. The government was aware that the data had been tainted with information from another company and had a clear duty to disclose this information.
The opinion of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on an assessment of evidence that favored the government, despite Hosseinipour providing significant proof that all the data and related testimonies were false. This reliance on misleading testimonies from four key witnesses impeded a fair evaluation of a specific argument. Ultimately, this false evidence played a crucial role in dismissing each argument presented.
Legal Precedent
The Supreme Court has overturned similar cases upheld by the Appeal Court based on the discovery of false evidence.
Such a case is Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. (1967), also known as the Bloody Shorts Case, where the Supreme Court overturned an appeal decision that relied on the same false evidence that prosecutors had failed to disclose.
In Napue, the conviction was upheld initially despite knowledge of the false evidence.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this decision in Napue v. Illinois, determining that the failure to correct the false testimony violated Napue’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Court stated that a conviction based on false evidence known to the State is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court highlighted the importance of witness credibility to a jury’s decision and concluded that the prosecutor’s failure to correct the false testimony, even if it only concerned the witness’s credibility, could have impacted the trial’s fairness and outcome
Impact:
This decision reinforced the idea that prosecutors have an obligation to be truthful and accurate in their presentation of evidence at trial, and it laid the groundwork for future developments in the Brady rule. The ruling in Miller v. Pate established that prosecutors must not knowingly use false evidence or suppress exculpatory evidence. The case is often cited in discussions of prosecutorial misconduct and the importance of fairness and due process in criminal trials according to brady.drolshagen.me.
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The misrepresented data in the i2G case is similar to the notorious “bloody shorts” case. In the latter, the government was aware that the blood stain evidence was false but still allowed it to be presented as valid through a key witness. In the i2G case, the misrepresentations were even more extreme because they constituted direct evidence used to prove the offense. These misrepresentations were supported by four key witnesses and were presented alongside testimony from 16 other witnesses. In Miller v. Pate, the bloody shorts were circumstantial evidence that was misrepresented by a single key witness. Therefore, if Miller justified an overturned conviction, Hosseinipour’s argument is substantially more compelling and deserves a reevaluation of the evidence under the appropriate standard of review.
Miller v Pate held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction secured by the knowing use of false evidence. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, followed. Pp. 386 U. S. 2-7
When reviewing a guilty verdict, we determine only “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
However, several legal precedents challenge an appeal decision that relies on viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution when the evidence and witness testimony presented at trial were false:
- Napue v. Illinois: This landmark Supreme Court case established that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false evidence or testimony by the prosecution violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. A defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution knowingly solicited or allowed the false testimony to go uncorrected. If a Napue violation is established, a new trial is warranted if there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment.
- Brady v. Maryland: This case established the prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, regardless of whether it is requested. If the prosecution withholds evidence that is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment, it violates due process. This principle extends to evidence that could impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness, including evidence of false statements or undisclosed agreements.
- Kyles v. Whitley: This case clarified that the prosecution’s Brady obligation extends to evidence in the possession of the entire “prosecution team,” including law enforcement agencies. It also emphasized the importance of evaluating the materiality of withheld evidence cumulatively, meaning the combined effect of all undisclosed favorable evidence must be considered to assess its potential impact on the trial.
- “Bloody shorts” case: This notorious case involved the state introducing “blood-stained” undershorts as evidence, which later turned out to be stained with paint. The Supreme Court granted relief due to the prosecution’s deliberate misrepresentation.
These precedents highlight that while appellate courts generally review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this standard is overridden if the conviction is tainted by the knowing use of false evidence or the suppression of material exculpatory evidence. In such circumstances, the fairness and integrity of the trial are fundamentally undermined, requiring a new trial.
Following Hosseinipour’s conviction, significant evidence emerged indicating that exculpatory evidence had been intentionally discredited and that key data central to the case had been manipulated. Reynolds validated this. He confirmed the reliability of the “purposely discredited” exculpatory data. (7240)and verified the data manipulations that formed the government’s key gain-loss evidence, falsely represented through four key witnesses.
Since Hosseinipour had already filed a notice of appeal, she attempted to raise these issues directly through this court.
The government acknowledged the manipulations, admitting to the “filtering out” of key commissions, which resulted in inflated losses of over $ 28 million. They conceded that the issues surrounding the 7240 data make it significant evidence in these proceedings. This data indicates that over $38 million in commission payments were made to the alleged victims, and that $28 million of these commissions were “filtered out” of the “Participant Gains” to form 101i. These amounts are crucial, as they alter the elements of the offense. Keep, Reynolds, and Sauber falsely described 101i as the total “Participant Gains and Losses which misrepresented the losses of 18,000 distributors. Consequently, the integrity of the entire trial was compromised.
Notably, the purchase, or “loss data,” included $28 million in commissions that were used as the basis for those purchases. Reynolds confirmed that these omissions were related to the use of “gift certificates” and “internal transfers” (commissions) to purchase the products. The $28 million in commissions should have been deducted from the purchases. These actions inflated the “loss figures” by over $28 million.
Agent McClelland excluded the same $28 million in his Summary Chart 232, which the government conceded lacked support. The false summaries exaggerated the losses by 28 million. His false testimony as to distributor gains and losses compromised the integrity of the entire trial. The government knew the summaries were false and had a duty to disclose.
Much like the I2G Jury, the Appeal Court was unable to assess a data-dependent analysis of a pyramid scheme or a fraudulent scheme based on losses, as the data and testimonies presented have been proven false.
Dr. Keep, Agent Sauber, and Reynolds delivered additional unequivocally false testimonies. The i2G data Dr. Keep cited in his critical analysis was invalid, as it included two years of data from XTG1, a company unrelated to i2G that had only begun operating after i2G’s closure. All three witnesses misrepresented data spanning from 2015 to 2017, involving 4,091 XTG1 distributors and approximately six million in sales, and presented it as if it were data from i2G. This gross misrepresentation significantly altered key benchmarks the jury relied upon, including total sales, distributors, and losses. Without accurate data, assessing the offense became impossible. The government’s failure to dispute this point is particularly significant. This undermined Dr. Keep’s analysis, which was incorrectly assumed to be based on accurate information but ultimately did not even reflect i2G.
The prosecutors were the only ones aware that they had filtered out 75% of the commission paid to the alleged victims, which served as the primary source of their funding. Hosseinipour, with ineffective assistance and without even knowing the data was relevant to her, had no way of knowing that the government had filtered out $28 million from the key evidence to represent gains and losses through four key witnesses. She had no way to know that the 12G data was compromised with Xtg1 data.
The government acknowledged that the dates on its data were obscured. Reynolds misidentified data from 2015 to 2017 as belonging to I2G, despite testifying that I2G was closed by January 2015. He admitted that the dates of the data were not verified. However, emails confirm he was aware and continued to support Maike’s “new project.” This indicates that the government was aware that his statements were false and had a duty to correct his false testimony.
Where the prosecutor has knowledge that testimony by a government witness is false and fails to reveal that information, reversal of a criminal conviction is virtually automatic. United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 797-98 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); notes 46-48 infra and accompanying text
The government’s only counterargument was to reference an unrelated statement from Reynolds, asserting that his system did not track “checks,” which would be considered “outside of his system.” However, the $28 million omitted was the “internal commissions” directly tracked by his system, which the jury had been explicitly informed were “included” in the data.
The government has not disputed the false evidence identified during this process, which is confirmed.
The intentionally inflated loss data, as shown in Exhibit 101 and Summary Chart 232, were misrepresented by the testimonies of four key witnesses. These testimonies inaccurately portrayed the total gains and losses for each participant. The government knew that $28 million in commission payments had been omitted and had a duty to correct these false testimonies. These omissions invalidated all the data and testimonies, leading to the assumption of losses and victims that did not exist. The court relied on this misleading evidence and testimony to form its opinions, ultimately denying Hosseinipour’s arguments. The harm is clearly evident.
Examples Related to False Standard Reliance on False Evidence to form its opinion
For example, the Court’s conclusion regarding a fraudulent scheme, such as a pyramid scheme or securities losses, was based on a falsely represented figure of $34 million in losses. However, Reynolds’ data shows that the total commission payments amounted to $38 million. This indicates that the loss data the Court of Appeals relied on was false evidence. Therefore, the Court’s opinion, which was derived from this false evidence, is invalid.
Furthermore, the evidence from the 7240 data demonstrates that individuals were earning significant commissions, including those who were not witnesses but were categorized as “victim investors” in the jury instructions. Specifically, the 7240 data reveal that the alleged victims—Kim, Pepito, Jeong, and Hussain—collectively earned over $770,000. This contradicts the hearsay claims that they suffered losses of hundreds of thousands of dollars, as represented in the jury instructions.
None of these individuals was available for cross-examination to address the “victim investor” hearsay presented in the jury instructions as factual.
The discoveries are so significant and contrary to the principles of a fair trial that suggesting Hosseinipour should have uncovered this evidence sooner—despite her ineffective assistance—would undermine the concept of justice. Hosseinipour had no way to discover the “filtered” commissions and could not confront hearsay that lacked witnesses. Furthermore, Hosseinipour’s attorney was unaware that the company data, unknown to her as a distributor, could be used as evidence against her. He did not even know that he was allowed to object to information unrelated to his client.
Furthermore, the names of these key alleged victims were not released beforehand, and the commission data related to their gains or losses was falsely represented through “filtered” commission data that omitted $28 million.
The presentation of invalid, manipulated, and non-i2G data by four key witnesses constituted a fraud against the court. The testimonies significantly impacted the trial’s outcome, and without them, the verdict would likely have been different. Furthermore, the fact that distributors were earning considerably more income than they represented supported Hosseinipour’s good faith belief and others in the company. Therefore, a new trial is necessary in the interest of justice.
This Court directly relied on the same false evidence as the jury to support its conclusions—that fraud and conspiracy occurred and that Hosseinipour knowingly participated. This highlights the harmful impact of the false testimonies, which compromised the integrity of the trial. Supreme Court precedent requires a new trial.
Hosseinipour presented substantial evidence of false evidence in her direct appeal, which the government did not deny in its response. They admitted to inflated losses and that significant commissions were “filtered out” from the 7240 data to create their key data, which purported to represent total gains and losses of i2G participants. Additionally, the government did not dispute the validity of the 7240 data, which Jerry Reynolds affirmed through his affidavit. This data shows that over $38 million was paid to i2G distributors identified as alleged victims, and that over $28 million of those commissions were omitted to create the false total payments of only $9.5 million. This was known to the government and misrepresented through the testimony of four key witnesses. The government had the duty to correct these false testimonies. The 7240 data commission totals are evident by sorting the commission total by the J tab, which confirms these totals.
The government did not dispute the fact that all of its key witnesses misrepresented non-I2G data from an unrelated company, Xtg1, which was collected two years after I2G was closed, as I2G data.
The only defense presented, and the basis for the appeal court’s dismissal of the extensive false evidence, was a single “unrelated” statement by Jerry Reynolds, which indicated that his system did not track certain external “checks.” The appeal court accepted this unrelated statement as grounds to conclude that the jury had been informed about commission omissions that could have been challenged through cross-examination. However, the $28 million in paid commissions were “hidden” — not disclosed and deliberately omitted from 101i and the Summary Chart 232. These commissions constituted the “internal commissions” that Reynolds’ system tracked, which were explicitly represented to the jury as included in the data.
The findings could not be revealed during the trial because of deliberate efforts to undermine the reliability of the US 7240 data. However, Reynolds denied the statements that had been repeatedly attributed to him about “problems” with the data, and he submitted an affidavit to affirm its reliability. Additionally, Hosseinipour had no way of anticipating that the government would “filter out” 28 million dollars.
Challenging the appeal decision
To challenge the appeal decision based on false evidence, the defendant would typically need to file a post-conviction petition or motion and demonstrate the following:
- False Testimony or Evidence: The defendant must provide evidence proving that the testimony or evidence presented at trial was indeed false.
- Prosecution’s Knowledge: The defendant must show that the prosecution knew or should have known that the evidence was false.
- Materiality: The defendant must establish that the false testimony or suppressed evidence was “material,” meaning there’s a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the truth been revealed or the evidence been disclosed.
Successfully demonstrating these elements can lead to the reversal of a conviction and potentially a new trial, regardless of the usual standard of reviewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
Supreme Court precedent in Napue requires prosecutors to disclose any false evidence that they knew or should have known to be false, especially when it involves key witnesses. Hosseinipour presented substantial evidence indicating that the government was aware of false data, much of which they did not deny. This false information was misrepresented through the testimony of four key witnesses. The inaccuracies in their testimony significantly impacted the integrity of the trial. As such, reversal is required
The allegations that i2G operated as a pyramid scheme were wholly supported by data-driven spreadsheets and summary charts presented through four key witnesses: Reynolds, Keep, McClelland, and Sauber. These witnesses highlighted the losses incurred by victim investors through 101i, as shown in the Summary chart 232. However, Hosseinipour provided significant and credible evidence that the data presented by these witnesses was false, a claim that the government did not contest. The government acknowledged as true that substantial commission payments to alleged victims—exceeding $28 million—were “filtered out” of the loss representations in 101i, which represented Total Commission Gains and Losses.
Key considerations in the Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has also emphasized that courts have a duty to order a retrial when prosecutors fail to disclose favorable evidence, especially when it could have affected the jury’s decision. While the Sixth Circuit, according to Ronald W. Chapman II, has sometimes allowed convictions to stand even with instances of prosecutorial misconduct, particularly when the evidence against the defendant is strong, it has also vacated convictions due to “flagrant misconduct” by prosecutors, says the Sixth Circuit Appellate Blog.
In essence, a defendant seeking to overcome the Sixth Circuit’s presumption of viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government in the presence of false evidence needs to demonstrate that:
- The evidence used was demonstrably false.
- The prosecution knew or should have known it was false.
- There is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence impacted the jury’s verdict or the outcome of the proceedings.
Successfully establishing these points can necessitate a new trial where the facts can be presented to the jury, free from prosecutorial misconduct.
United States v. Nettles (No. 12-16935) before the Ninth Circuit involved a petitioner challenging a prison disciplinary violation, alleging that false evidence was presented against him. The petition for rehearing en banc in this case was reheard based on claims of due process violations, including the use of false evidence.
Examples of Argument Influenced By False Evidence
The critical arguments before the panel could not be fairly assessed with false assumptions drawn from false evidence- nor viewed in the light most favorable to the government based on that false evidence
For example
1.) Determining whether I2G was a pyramid scheme or a security depended on the false data
The argument over whether i2g was a pyramid scheme or a security hinges on having accurate data to substantiate the claimed losses. It can be demonstrated that the alleged losses did not happen. Given the presence of false evidence, this highlights the need for a rehearing.
Similarly, the fraud charge, whether it involves mail fraud or securities fraud, depends on the resulting losses. When the loss data is false, this raises questions about whether Hosseinipour could have knowingly joined a criminal conspiracy to defraud others, given that the data indicates distributors earned $38 million.
The argument about whether Hosseinipour was prejudiced by the lack of limiting instructions related to her partner led to the inference throughout the trial that if he was guilty, then she was also guilty. This panel, in the light most favorable to the government, selected single phrases that were contradicted by the government’s own evidence. However, in light of the proof of false evidence, the proper standard of review may have correctly concluded that the lack of limiting instruction greatly prejudiced her and that the evidence to convict her was insufficient.
The arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were widely accepted, as noted by the Honorable Judge Kethledge, who stated that Hosseinipour presented substantial evidence of inadequate legal representation. However, the panel did not vacate her sentence; they only voided the motion for a new trial, concluding that she was not prejudiced because other attorneys handled her defense. There is no legal basis supporting that reasoning, nor is there a way to determine that Hosseinipour was not prejudiced, especially given that she was denied any defense as an individual distributor far removed from the owners.
No argument can be evaluated under the standard of review that is invalidated when it is based on false evidence.
All of the panel’s opinions were influenced by the erroneous belief that the losses amounted to $34 million and that this money flowed to Hosseinipour rather than to others. In reality, the evidence of $38 million in commission payments suggests that Hosseinipour was one of many distributors earning a substantial income with the company, and she had legitimate reasons to trust the company’s viability.
Moreover, the idea that only those at the top earn an income is a misrepresentation challenged by the government’s witnesses. In a multi-level marketing structure, an individual’s income is directly tied to the earnings of those they support in their downline, rather than the number of people they defraud. Therefore, if this argument had been evaluated using the correct legal standards considering the false evidence, it would likely have led to a different conclusion regarding Hosseinipour’s involvement in a conspiracy.
6th Circuit cases overturned by finding of false evidence
Here are a couple of cases from the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals that were overturned or involved issues related to false evidence:
- Chambers v. Sanders: Danny Burton spent 32 years in prison after being wrongfully convicted of first-degree murder in 1987. Detective Ronald Sanders was accused of using witness manipulation and intimidation tactics to secure false testimony, leading to the conviction. Burton’s conviction was vacated in 2019 after witnesses recanted and the misconduct came to light. His sons sued Detective Sanders and the City of Detroit for violating their right to family integrity due to the wrongful incarceration.
- United States v. Thomas: The 6th Circuit reversed a death penalty case prosecuted by Shelby County District Attorney Amy Weirich. The FBI had paid a key witness $750, but the witness lied about it under oath. The court ruled that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose this payment rather than allowing the witness to commit perjury. This led to a new trial for Andrew Lee Thomas Jr..
In addition, the Sixth Circuit Appellate Blog mentions cases where convictions were vacated due to “flagrant misconduct” by prosecutors, which involved improper vouching for government witnesses and attacking the credibility of defense witnesses with false statements.
It’s important to note that the issue of false or fabricated evidence in convictions, including wrongful convictions, is a serious concern across many jurisdictions, not just the 6th Circuit, according to the National Institute of Justice. Some common contributing factors include mistaken eyewitness identification, false confessions, lying jailhouse informants, prosecutorial or state misconduct, and perjured testimony.
Restatement
Glossip v. Oklahoma is a US Supreme Court case that illustrates the scenario where an appeal court views evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution but invalidates this view due to reliance on false evidence.
Specifically, in Glossip v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court noted that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ (OCCA) decision failed to consider that the prosecution knowingly relied on false evidence, impacting the verdict’s reliability.
More broadly, the Supreme Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This principle, rooted in cases like Napue v. Illinois, dictates that a new trial is necessary if the false testimony could have, in any reasonable likelihood, affected the jury’s judgment.
While reviewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution is a standard applied by appellate courts when assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, it is not a license to overlook or validate a conviction based on evidence proven to be false. In fact, cases like Brady v. Maryland further expand on the prosecution’s obligations to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, including evidence that could impeach the credibility of witnesses, which if withheld, can violate due process.
Therefore, even when applying the “light most favorable to the prosecution” standard, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a conviction cannot stand if it is based on evidence that was known to be false by the prosecution and was material to the outcome of the trial.
Supplemental
Here’s an overview of how due process violations relate to the standard of reviewing evidence on appeal (specifically, the “light most favorable to the government” standard):
1. The general appeal standard: Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government
When reviewing a criminal conviction on appeal, courts generally apply a standard that requires them to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. This means the court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”.
2. Due process violations and the override of the standard
While the “light most favorable” standard is usually applied, certain due process violations can affect how an appellate court reviews evidence. Here are some key Supreme Court cases illustrating this point:
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963): This landmark case established that the prosecution’s suppression of evidence favorable to the accused, where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, violates due process. In Brady’s case, the prosecution withheld a co-defendant’s confession that might have reduced Brady’s sentence, though it would not have changed the conviction under the state law of the time.
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972): This case expanded on the Brady rule, holding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence impacting a witness’s credibility also constitutes a due process violation.
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959): The Court ruled that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false testimony by the state, even if the state’s counsel did not know it was false, violates due process.
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995): The Court further clarified the Brady rule, stating that prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose all material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant, even if the defense does not request it. In Kyles, the Court found a due process violation where the prosecution failed to disclose evidence that would have undermined confidence in the verdict, even when collectively considering all the suppressed evidence.
In essence, these cases establish that if the prosecution withholds or fails to correct material evidence favorable to the defense, including evidence that impacts a witness’s credibility, the subsequent conviction may be overturned, potentially triggering a new trial. This means that the appellate review process is not simply about whether there was sufficient evidence to convict, but also whether the trial was fair and fundamentally consistent with due process.
In summary, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution on appeal remains generally applicable. However, when due process violations, like the withholding of favorable evidence, are shown to have occurred, appellate courts may be compelled to overturn convictions and order new trials, even if the original evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to support the sentence.