To show that distributor gains were hundreds of percent greater than what was represented by the government at trial, you can review these spreadsheets, which were pulled from the i2G data provided by the data providers. You can see that top earners in i2G were not represented as top earners, but were shown as having lost significant money. This was the case even for top earners who earned in excess of one million dollars, such as Jason Syn, Steven Yu, KRoss, Scott Majors, David Park, and others. The difference between the gain rate represented to the jury and the actual gain rate is astounding. In some cases, the actual gain rate was more than 1000% higher than what was described to the jury.

The following spreadsheet disproves the government’s entire theory of 30 million in losses, or any amount close to that. In fact, the data provider has provided an affidavit that the representation of a 96% loss rate for I2G distributors was false and that I2G had only a 63% loss rate, much higher than the typical mlm.

Save The MLM Industry From Criminalization Writ to the Supreme Court

Hosseinipour’s motion is the most significant action to preserve the MLM industry and protect distributor rights against arbitrary prosecution by corrupt or overzealous prosecutors.

The MLM Industry and distributors are in great danger of arbitrary prosecution based on the precedent set by the 6th Circuit, allowing pyramid schemes to substitute for mail fraud and allowing participation in an mlm deemed to be a pyramid scheme as criminal conspiracy, which can land you 20 years in prison. Every distributor in every mlm is at risk when a subjective determination of “over-focus” on recruiting can now land you in prison. Crazy, but true!

Please read our Writ to the Supreme Court on this incredibly important issue that affects all of us. Write your Congressional or Senatorial representatives to register your objection to prosecuting distributors for participation in an alleged pyramid scheme without intent.

I am also including my response, which conveys a stronger tone and sense of urgency, as I am the one directly experiencing these prosecutorial abuses, and they are unacceptable. Government misconduct has become so normalized within the court system that defense attorneys often accept it as routine corruption perpetrated by prosecutors. For someone encountering this for the first time, it feels wrong, shocking, and, in my opinion, criminal. I am determined to hold the prosecutors accountable for their unethical behavior and to prevent this from happening to others. It is crucial to stand against prosecutorial corruption and expose the truth so that no one else has to endure this.

Please read our Motion 33 for New Trial based on new evidence, based on the false evidence used by the Government and its instructions to manipulate the key data presented to a jury. They filtered out over 28 million in commissions earned by distributors to invent a totally false and dramatically inflated loss rate and victims where none existed.

The Appeal Panel failed to understand Hosseinipour’s argument about anti-saturation plans.  Instead, the panel focused solely on the legitimacy of the 5,000-person cap, which Judge Nalbandian conceded was contraindicative of a pyramid scheme.

However, Hosseinipour’s key argument was that the “customer reliance” incorporated into the plan would reduce or eliminate the need for recruitment. Overwhelming evidence supports the anti-saturation plan.

The panel’s reliance on subjective product valuation overlooks that the actual plan—per the programming—required distributors to use the i2G products or direct customers to use the products to earn, stay active, and advance in the plan.  

 (Exh101a,101b documenting product and usage purchases resulting in commission, (101c) casino transactions demonstrating commissions earned from casino chip purchases, (exh 145) conference call definite the 25% of casino usage paid as commissions,  Doc 487 #3857- 3874 Dr. Keep documentation of 1.2 million in casino chip usage resulting in commissions, ie R.497,#4028,29, 48-49; R.505,#4551-52; see App’x047-48,59,84, See, e.g. R.504, #4309-11; R.497, #4063-68; testimony affirming customer reliance in i2G plan, Exh 158 6 ways to get paid, 104, 107a, 107b, 106c) 

Reynolds best explained the I2G plan he programmed with “built-in” consumer reliance to earn commissions and advance based on product sales and “usage” without the requirement to recruit (Doc 497 4021-23, pp. 4028, 29,  4035, 36, 4043-49). Distributors could advance to the emperor level based solely on product usage (Exh 497 4036). 

The panel mistakenly understood that “no recruiting required” meant that no work was required to gain “passive income.” However, overwhelming evidence disputes this and points to the requirement of driving customers to the casino. The requirement for product usage, however, is outlined in the I2G program rules (see doc 497, #4021,22) and identified as an advancement means without recruitment. The panel misunderstood these requirements due to more government misdirection away from their evidence.

Moreover, Reynolds identified the retail “casino customer” that generated “distributor rewards” from “outside retail customers” without recruitment. (Exhibit 102, Document 497 4043-49). He emphasized that the commissions” generated from casino chip usage were the ‘whole point’ of the plan. (Doc 497 #4048)  The connection between product usage and distributor rewards, unrelated to recruitment, disproves the existence of a pyramid scheme, per Koskot. 

 For the same reasons, this disproves a securities offering or scheme to defraud based on an “abstruse” definition of a pyramid scheme. There is no question that this plan was being promoted and was occurring. Indeed, you can’t disprove a defendant’s mens rea with a plan, by its very design,  that does not fit the “abstruse: definition of a pyramid scheme.

Moreover, as product usage increased, the need for recruitment to earn commissions diminished. The plan was working, as evidenced by $1.2 million in casino chips usage, which generated the same commissions independent of recruiting.

The anti-saturation plan, explained in Hosseinipour’s videos and the i2G materials, documented that 25% of the usage of the I2G product generates commission without the need to recruit others. Hence, the slogan “earn from every bet placed.”

The company’s materials support the anti-saturation plan, as highlighted in the company’s PowerPoint tagline: “Get paid to play,” relating to commissions earned from “customer play” at the casino without the need to recruit. (101a, b, c) 

The Emperor cap of 5000 supports the I2G plan to shift the focus from recruitment to acquiring customers to use the I2G products, which generated the same commissions under the plan. This approach would allow the company to achieve indefinite growth without relying on recruitment, avoiding market saturation.. 

Hosseinipour presented substantial evidence to support her argument, surpassing the minimum requirements outlined by Judge Nalbandian. However, she was denied this affirmative defense twice; First when defense expert Warren was prohibited from raising the anti-saturation argument. The government argued that the anti-saturation argument was irrelevant as I2G faced no risk of saturation and would not raise the issue. Despite this promise, Dr. Keep strongly argued the dangers of saturation, which Warren could not rebut. The anti-saturation plan defense was again denied in jury instructions.

Judge Nalbandian noted the inconsistency of a pyramid scheme with no saturation risk. Despite acknowledging the odd concession, he failed to consider that this was related to the same anti-saturation plan that had been fought against being introduced.  Nor did the government address this contradiction or rebut Hosseinipour’s argument, which was critical to explain her consistent belief in the company’s legitimacy.

Dr. Keep, Anzalone, and associated materials (101a, 101b, 101c, 503b) confirmed that 25% of product usage generated commissions unrelated to recruiting within the i2G plan. This finding disqualified i2G from being classified as a pyramid scheme according to the Koskot standard, a security under the Howey test, and a scheme to defraud based on characteristics of a pyramid scheme. Currently, no law or guidance clearly defines a pyramid scheme beyond the vague descriptions provided by Koskot.

To establish a pyramid scheme, distributor rewards must be unrelated to product sales. This can not apply when “product usage” results in distributor rewards independent of recruiting.  

This is another presentation of the same argument- it ties in Nalbandian, which could be influential with him specifically.

The evidence of the anti-saturation plan also proves why I2G cannot be a pyramid scheme, a securities offering, or a scheme to defraud. The same argument demonstrated an “anti-saturation” defense that she was entitled to. However, the panel did not review the argument, nor did the government respond to it.

The overlooked “anti-saturation” plan argument also highlights the prejudice of denying her an “affirmative defense” through a defense expert, by barring Warren from presenting the “anti-saturation” concepts.  The primary reason for excluding Warren’s testimony was that “anti-saturation” was irrelevant because i2G had no risk of saturation.  This demonstrates prejudice and another misrepresentation to the Court, as the government strongly argued the concepts of saturation through Keep.   

Judge Nalbandian pointed out the inconsistency of a pyramid scheme with no risk of saturation, but misinterpreted its meaning and failed to consider what was implied, namely, Hosseinipour’s evidence of an anti-saturation plan. Nor did the government explain the contradiction.  This argument was especially crucial to Hosseinipour, describing why she continued believing in the company’s legitimacy as a mere distributor.

The panel failed to consider Hosseinipour’s arguments despite substantial government evidence supporting her claim, including testimony from three witnesses, three data exhibits, five videos, a conference call, the i2G business plan (document 503b), and the i2G business PowerPoint presentation.  The comprehensive evidence proved that an anti-saturation plan was integrated into the compensation structure, which linked rewards to the usage of i2G products, as outlined by Koskot. These commissions were not solely dependent on recruitment or unrelated to product sales.

The evidence established the direct link between distributor rewards and product usage, independent of recruiting. Distributors received real products and were directly compensated based on the product usage . This is not debatable, as all the government evidence affirms this.  For instance, transactions related to casinos and fantasy sports generated $1.5 million in retail sales, resulting in over $360,000 in business volume (BV), which paid commissions through the i2G plan without recruiting.

Reynolds explained the SIP plan, which outlined the rules that allowed distributors to “activate” and advance through the i2G plan without needing to recruit others, through product sales or usage. He emphasized that the “whole purpose” of the plan was to generate commissions from casino transactions. There could be no conclusion that distributor rewards were unrelated to product sales, as required by the Koskot test to determine a pyramid scheme. The fact that the i2G plan paid 25% from the product transactions (25% from every bet placed) demonstrated that I2G could not, by law, be a pyramid scheme, a securities offering, and had an anti-saturation plan in place.

The panel’s opinion overlooked Hosseinipour’s argument in favor of the anti-saturation plan, despite its grounding in the government’s evidence. Instead, the panel only focused on the “numerical cap” on emperors. However, Hosseinipour’s primary argument centered around the commissions generated from product usage without the need for recruitment.

The panel relied primarily on Dr. Keep’s opinions that i2G operated as a pyramid scheme. However, his analysis was tainted by inflated commissions and false data from another company. However, Keep and two other key government witnesses affirmed the anti-saturation plan, which included 25% of the BV or commissions from product transactions, paid in binary, matching, and leadership bonuses. The evidence unequivocally tied product sales or usage to distributor rewards.  Moreover, I2G was not a pyramid scheme and had an effective anti-saturation plan

The panel was influenced by the false evidence of $34 million pyramid scheme with 97% losses, which is disproved by the data.  As a result, the panel could not assess any of the arguments presented fairly.

The examples relate to three critical arguments presented by Hosseinipour. However, none of her arguments could be fairly assessed using a standard that favors the government based on false evidence to reach each conclusion.

Light most favorable to the government versus the weight of the evidence in the legal context  

In a legal context, particularly when reviewing a jury verdict or considering a motion for acquittal, courts often apply the standard of viewing the evidence in the “light most favorable to the government.” According to the LSD, the law means that the court considers all evidence and inferences that support the prosecution’s case and disregards any evidence that contradicts it. The purpose is to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

However, this standard does not imply a complete disregard for the weight of the evidence. The “weight of the evidence” refers to the credibility, persuasiveness, and reliability of the evidence presented. In contrast to the “light most favorable” standard, which focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, assessing the “weight of the evidence” allows the court to evaluate the strength and believability of the evidence in supporting one side over the other. 

For instance, when considering a motion for a new trial based on the argument that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, a court may re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the overall balance of the evidence, even though the evidence might have been sufficient to support the conviction. 

In essence, while the “light most favorable to the government” standard requires a narrow review of whether a rational jury could have found guilt, evaluating the “weight of the evidence” involves a broader assessment of whether a jury was justified in reaching that conclusion based on the overall strength and credibility of the evidence. 

Shift to the weight of the evidence and prejudice to the defendant in the case of false evidence.

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government” is a legal standard primarily used in reviewing motions for judgment of acquittal or challenges to the sufficiency of evidence after a conviction. In this review, the court assumes the prosecution’s evidence is credible and sufficient to support a conviction, resolving conflicting inferences in the government’s favor. This standard protects against judicial overreach into the jury’s role as fact-finder. 

However, false evidence introduces a critical caveat to this standard. The principle is that convictions based on known or unknowingly false testimony violate due process. While the “light most favorable” standard usually prioritizes the government’s case, the existence of false evidence shifts the focus to: 

• The weight of the evidence: This refers to the persuasiveness and believability of the evidence, not just its quantity. When false evidence is involved, its weight becomes significantly diminished, potentially impacting the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.
• Prejudice to the defendant: The courts must assess whether the false evidence influenced the trial’s outcome and harmed the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Factors like the state of the evidence, the effect of other instructions, and counsel’s arguments are considered when determining prejudice. 

In essence, the presence of false evidence requires a deeper examination of its validity and its impact on the fairness of the trial rather than simply accepting it in the light most favorable to the government. The due process clause protects against convictions based on testimony that prosecutors knew or should have known was false, and courts should clarify requirements for relief in such cases, including considering imputed prosecution knowledge and relaxing the requirement that false testimony reach the level of perjury. 

In cases where false evidence is a factor, defendants may argue that they did not know the evidence was false, did not act with criminal intent, or were unaware of pending legal proceedings to defend against charges related to false evidence. 

I found the Feb 2025 Supreme Court case, Glossip, which supports the appropriate standard for evaluating false evidence or a Napue Violation. The prosecution had the obligation to correct the false testimony. The defense did not have the obligation to learn of the government’s deception and challenge the manipulations of data that they had no way of knowing about during the trial. If there is any sense of justice, this will positively impact our chances of obtaining a new trial, which is demanded through the Supreme Court’s rulings in Glossip.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent-Appellee
v.
FARADAY HOSSEINIPOUR
Petitioner-Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky

PETITION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC

R. Kenyon Meyer
DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
101 South Fifth Street, Suite 2500
Louisville, KY 40202
(502) 540-2300
kenyon.meyer@dinsmore.com
Counsel for Faraday Hosseinipour
Philip E. Cecil
FULTZ MADDOX DICKENS PLC
101 S. Fifth Street, 27th Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(502) 588-2000
pcecil@fmdlegal.com
Counsel for Faraday Hosseinipour
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities…………………………………………………………………………………….. iii
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(b) Statement ……………………………………….1
Background ………………………………………………………………………………………………….3
Argument……………………………………………………………………………………………………..5
I. The full court should resolve problems with pyramid scheme
Instructions………………………………………………………………………………..5
A. The instructions incorrectly deemed the Emperor Program
a scheme to defraud without finding specific intent……………….5
B. The instructions were unconstitutionally vague under
Percoco…………………………………………………………………………….9
C. The instructions contained a legally erroneous theory ………….11
II. The panel failed to apply Glossip to the Napue argument………………13
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
Glossip v. Oklahoma
145 S.Ct. 612 (2025)………………………………………………… 2, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17. 18
Griffin v. United States
502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991)………………………………………………………………………..2, 11
Napue v. Illinois
360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) ………………………………………………………. 13, 14, 17
Percoco v. United States
598 U.S. 319, 329 (2023) ………………………………………………………………. 2, 9, 10
Smith v. Goguen
415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)………………………………………………………………………. 10
United States v. Feola
420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975)…………………………………………………………………….. 2, 9
United States. v. Gold Unlimited, Inc.
177 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1999)…………………………………………… 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11
United States v. Maike
142 F.4th 367, 379 (6th Cir. 2025)…………………………………… 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12
United States v. Maike
No. 22-6114, 2025 WL 1770555, at *6 (6th Cir. June 26, 2025)…………… 15, 16
United States v. Rabinowitz
327 F.2d 62, 76–77 (6th Cir. 1964)…………………………………………………………… 2
Whole Living, Inc. v. Tolman
344 F. Supp. 2d 739, 745 (D. Utah 2004)………………………………………………….11
iv
Other Authorities
Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, April 2024……………….. 10
FTC Staff Offers Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level
Marketing, January 4, 2018 …………………………………………………………………… 10
Staff Advisory Opinion – Pyramid Scheme Analysis, January 14, 2004…………… 10
The Bottom Line about Multi-Level Marketing, October 2009………………………. 10
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 40(b) STATEMENT
In support of rehearing en banc, this proceeding involves questions of
exceptional importance. The panel decision also conflicts with Supreme Court and
Sixth Circuit precedent.
The legality of pyramid scheme instructions in criminal cases is exceptionally
important. No other circuit has published an opinion on the issue. United States v.
Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1999)(“Gold”), first confronted the issue
and included a suggestion that future “prudent” courts improve its instruction. Judge
Moore’s concurrence in Gold reflects a division in this Court because she concluded
that the “court erred in instructing the jury that a pyramid scheme, as the court
defined the term, necessarily constitutes a scheme to defraud.” Id. at 489. This
“err[or]” continues to be binding precedent—Judge Nalbandian in his Concurrence
here wrote, “Succeeding on [the pyramid scheme] theory was a shortcut of sorts in
[the Government’s] burden of proof.” United States. v. Maike, 142 F.4th 367, 379
(6th Cir. 2025). The full Court should address this issue because of its impact
throughout the country.

The instructions also violated Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent.
The panel’s published opinion affirmed the following instruction, which applied to
the mail fraud and securities fraud conspiracy counts:
A “pyramid scheme” is any plan…or other process characterized by the
payment by participants of money to the company in return for which
2
they receive the right to sell a product and the right to receive in return
for recruiting other participants into the program reward which are
unrelated to the sale of the product to ultimate users. The structure of a
pyramid scheme suggests that the focus is on promoting the sale of
interests in the venture rather than the sale of products, where
participants earn the right to profits by recruiting other participants,
who themselves are interested in recruitment fees rather than products.
A pyramid scheme constitutes a scheme to defraud.
(R.554,#5265-66.) The last sentence of this instruction improperly allowed the jury
to presume an intent to defraud in violation of United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671,
686 (1975), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 327 F.2d 62, 76–77 (6th Cir. 1964). The
second sentence of the instruction resulted from the suggestion in Gold that future
courts “supplement” the instruction to “reflect the difference between legitimate
multi-level marketing and illegal pyramids,” but it did the opposite. Moreover, the
instruction, described by the panel as “abstruse,” violated Percoco v. United States,
which held fraud instructions “must be defined with the clarity typical of criminal
statutes.” 598 U.S. 319, 329 (2023). The instructions also included an invalid legal
theory (that a program capped at 5,000 that included retail revenue could constitute
a pyramid scheme) and violated Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. at 59.
(R.554,#5265-66.)
Finally, the panel failed to apply the standard of review to the Government’s
use of false evidence set forth in Glossip v. Oklahoma, which was decided after oral
argument. 145 S.Ct. 612 (2025).
3
BACKGROUND
This trial focused on the claim that the Emperor program of Infinity 2 Global
(“I2G”), a multi-level marketing company (“MLM”), was a pyramid scheme.
Emperor participants were capped at 5,000, each of whom paid $5,000 for the usage
and resale rights of a package of present and future products to earn
commissions and for the right to share in profits I2G earned from an overseas,
online casino. Emperors who referred users to the casino received commissions
based on casino chip transactions. The success of the Emperor program depended
on the casino’s success, not endless recruiting.
Despite no saturation risk, the Government contended the Emperor program
was a pyramid scheme. (R.405,#3087.) Its proposed jury instructions were limited
to the Emperor program (R.420), and the final instructions asked whether the
Emperor program was a pyramid scheme. (R.554,#5265-68.) The defendants
defended against this theory. (R.671,#7618;R.476,#3631.)
In opening, the government made 18 references to “pyramid,” and transcripts
reference “pyramid” more than 800 times.
Appellant Hosseinipour was not one of the creators of I2G or the Emperor
program. She did not devise the plan and was a “low-level” participant.
(R.769,#11628.) Anzalone, the Government’s star witness, testified that
4
Hosseinipour would not lie, is a good person, would not deceive, and did not believe
she was doing anything improper. (R.511,#4830-31;R.505,#4760-61.)
Hosseinipour, like thousands of IBOs, joined I2G after it started.
(R.671,#7704.) She purchased Emperor packages like all the alleged victim
witnesses. But knowingly joining the Emperor program does not mean she (or other
IBOs) intended to defraud.
In its effort to prove a pyramid scheme, the Government introduced evidence
to show the percentage of IBOs who lost money. (R.498,#4163.) Government
witness Jerry Reynolds created and maintained I2G’s system that tracked financial
data. Before trial, the Government instructed him to create certain spreadsheets.
(R.498,#4209,4217.) For example, US-Exhibit 101i, named “participant gain-loss,”
purports to show how many IBOs earned more than they paid to I2G and how many
earned less than they paid. (R.498,#4163;R.487,#3876.) A declaration and
spreadsheets that Reynolds produced post-trial revealed that commissions had been
filtered out of 101i. (R.721-2;Ex.3 to R.721-2.) 101i did not include thousands of
commission transactions, which resulted in the exclusion of more than $7 million in
earnings by Emperors alone. (Ex.3 to R.721-2.) These Emperor commissions were
tracked by Reynolds’ system but not included in 101i. 101i shows Emperors earned
approximately $1.2 million, but his system actually tracked Emperor earnings of
$8.2 million. (Ex.3 to R.721-2.) 101i shows only 579 Emperors earned commissions,
5
but Reynolds’ system actually showed 3,308 unique Emperors by DealerID earned
commissions. (Compare US-101i with Ex.3 to R.722-2.) US-7240, another
spreadsheet generated from Reynolds’ system, reveals that his system tracked more
than $25 million in commissions earned by individuals that were filtered out of 101i.
(Compare US-7240 with US-101i). The Government had Reynolds remove this
exculpatory information from 101i.
Reynolds falsely testified that 101i reflected all the gains and losses tracked
by his system. (R.498,#4163.) Other witnesses relied on 101i and even the panel
twice cited the incorrect 96% loss rate from 101i. See Maike, 142 F.4th at 373-75.
The Government relied on 96% in opening and closing. (R.485,#3735;
R.671,#7724.) A rehearing should be granted to consider these facts in accordance
with the standard recently expressed in Glossip. 145 S.Ct 612.
ARGUMENT
I. The full court should resolve problems with pyramid scheme instructions.
A. The instructions incorrectly deemed the Emperor Program a
scheme to defraud without finding specific intent.
The instructions permitted Hosseinipour’s conspiracy convictions without a
finding of specific intent to defraud. The panel noted that the fraudulent nature of a
pyramid scheme is “implicit—any such scheme is doomed to fail—rather than
explicit.” Maike, 142 F.4th at 375. “Thus—the defendants rightly observe—in the
jury’s mind, a finding that defendants participated in a pyramid scheme could
6
substitute for a finding that they participated in a fraudulent scheme.” Id. The panel
also agreed that pyramid scheme definition did not require the jury expressly to find
it fraudulent. Id. But the panel incorrectly held that the instructions elsewhere
required a finding of fraudulent intent.
Unlike in Gold, Hosseinipour was charged with conspiracy. Instructions 3 had
2 elements: that two or more defendants agreed with another person to commit mail
fraud as defined in Instruction 8 and that Hosseinipour knowingly and voluntarily
joined the conspiracy. (R.554,#5259-60.) The district court denied the defendants’
request to include a third element: that defendants acted with the intent to defraud.
(R.545,#5221; R.692,#9912.) Here, like all IBOs, Hosseinipour knowingly joined
I2G; therefore, the critical question was whether she agreed to commit mail fraud as
defined by Instruction 8.
Instruction 8 began by correctly articulating the elements of mail fraud. It then
defined “scheme to defraud” as a “plan…by which someone intends to deprive
another of money…by means of false or fraudulent pretenses.” (R.554,#5265.) Then
the instruction defined pyramid scheme and directed the jury was a pyramid scheme
was a scheme to defraud. (Id. at #5265-66.)
The panel held the instructions were duplicative enough to salvage the
pyramid scheme definition’s missing intent element: “Instruction 8 directed the jury
to make a finding as to every component of a scheme to defraud.” Maike, 142 F.4th
7
at 376. However, because this was a conspiracy charge, Instruction 3 did not direct
the jury to find every component under Instruction 8—the charge at issue required
only an agreement to commit mail fraud. (R.554,#5259.) Further, Instruction 8
directed the jury that a pyramid scheme was a “scheme to defraud,” which it defined
to include intent. (Id.#5265-66.) Reading Instruction 8 as written, a finding of a
pyramid scheme required a finding of a “scheme to defraud,” which was deemed to
include intent.
Gold first grappled with this issue on plain error review. There, the defendant
devised the scheme, and the Court held it was not plain error to instruct that a
pyramid scheme was a scheme to defraud because the jury also had to find that the
defendant “knowingly devised” the scheme. Gold at 485. Here, Instruction 8 only
required “that the defendant knowingly participated in or devised” the pyramid
scheme. All IBOs, including Hosseinipour, knowingly participated in I2G. Thus, this
element did not cure the error for Hosseinipour.
In the Gold concurrence, Judge Moore found that instructing that a pyramid
scheme necessarily constituted a scheme to defraud was error. Gold at 490. Judge
Moore found the error harmless because the jury was required to separately find the
defendant acted with the intent to defraud. Hosseinpour did not enjoy this safeguard
because the conspiracy instruction contained no such instruction, and Instruction 8
directed that “scheme to defraud” included intent.
8
Hosseinipour was substantially prejudiced by this error because the
Government argued that the defendants “don’t have to know the official definition
of a pyramid scheme.” (R.690,#9369.) In closing, the Government argued that a
defendant does not have to know the official definition of pyramid scheme.
(R.671,#7689.) The Government argued, “[Did Anzalone know] what is a pyramid
scheme[?]… No. Can he still commit the crime? Absolutely.” Id.
Under the Government’s reading of the instructions, Hosseinipour did not
have to know what makes a pyramid scheme fraudulent. As the Concurrence noted,
“if a jury finds a pyramid scheme, it necessarily finds a scheme to defraud.” Maike,
142 F.4th at 383. Stated otherwise, “[p]yramid is a surrogate for everything except
use of the mails.” Id. at 383 fn. 2.
Under the instructions, the jury was permitted to convict Hosseinipour
without the necessary elements for both conspiracies. The jury instructions
eliminated Hosseinipour’s primary defense, which was extremely prejudicial.
The full Court should address the ongoing implications of Gold. MLMs have
an estimated 20 million distributors in the economy. And all MLMs “contain some
elements of a pyramid scheme;” “[n]o clear line separates illegal pyramid schemes
from legitimate [MLMs].” Gold at 475-80. Yet, as the Concurrence here explained,
Gold holds that “[s]ucceeding on [a pyramid scheme] theory was a shortcut of sorts
in its burden of proof.” Maike, 142 F.4th at 379. There should never be a shortcut for
9
the burden of proof, especially regarding an industry commonly understood to be
legal. This shortcut is especially dangerous for people like Hosseinipour who join an
existing MLM. Pyramid schemes are inherently fraudulent because people who join
them do not know they are destined to fail. Torres v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 838 F.3d
629, 643 (5th Cir. 2016)(en banc). Hosseinipour, like thousands of others, joined
I2G, without knowing it was a pyramid scheme. Because the Government claimed
that Hosseinipour transitioned between legitimate and unlawful conduct, the need
for consideration of her intent was essential. Feola, 420 U.S. at 685.
B. The instructions were unconstitutionally vague under Percoco.
The panel held, “[f]ederal law does not proscribe pyramid schemes
specifically….[T]he definition of a pyramid scheme is abstruse.” Maike, 142 F.4th
at 376. The “abstruse” instruction violated Percoco. 143 S.Ct. 1130. Percoco held
an instruction “must be defined with the clarity typical of criminal statutes and
should not be held to reach an illdefined category of circumstances simply because
of a smattering of [previous court] decisions.” Id. at 1137. The Concurrence
confirmed “the jury instructions…were too vague….And the Constitution’s promise
of due process does not tolerate that kind of uncertainty in our laws–especially when
criminal sanctions loom.” Id. at 1139. The Court held that precedent relied on in
instructions must define illegal acts “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited or in a manner that does not encourage
10
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 1138(internal quotation marks
omitted). The Concurrence explained that vague laws “impermissibly hand off the
legislature’s responsibility for defining criminal behavior to unelected prosecutors
and judges…” Id. at 1139(internal quotation marks omitted). If no clear line
delineates between legal and illegal conduct, the Government cannot convict based
on such conduct. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
The panel noted that pyramid scheme definition is “abstruse.” Maike, 142
F.4th at 376. Because it is vague, it is unconstitutional under Percoco. Moreover, the
instructions did not draw reasonably clear lines between what is forbidden and what
is not, so reversal is required. Gold, 177 F.3d at 475. Since Gold, FTC guidance on
what makes a pyramid scheme illegal has often changed. (Business Guidance
Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, April 2024; FTC Staff Offers Business
Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing, January 4, 2018; The Bottom Line
about Multi-Level Marketing, October 2009; Staff Advisory Opinion – Pyramid
Scheme Analysis, January 14, 2004).
The second sentence in the pyramid scheme instruction was an effort to fulfill
Gold’s suggestion that “[i]n subsequent cases involving alleged pyramid schemes,
prudent district courts might supplement [the definition] to reflect the difference
between legitimate [MLMs] and illegal pyramids….” Gold at 483. The Court then
cited state laws that only prohibit schemes that compensate participants primarily
11
for recruitment. This inferred a more tolerant standard than the definition used here,
which rendered any compensation for recruitment illegal. But the district court took
the opposite approach and made the definition even more nebulous. What a
company’s structure suggests cannot support a finding of criminal liability.
“Structure suggests” does not tell a jury what it needs to find; instead, it instructs the
jury to infer guilt because of a company’s pyramidal structure. Ordinary people
would interpret structure to mean shape. Legitimate MLMs have “structures” that
“contain some elements of a pyramid scheme.” Gold at 480; see Whole Living, Inc.
v. Tolman, 344 F. Supp. 2d 739, 745 (D. Utah 2004). The Government’s expert
agreed “[h]aving a pyramid shape in and of itself is not indicative of a pyramid
scheme.” (R.487,#3901.) The full Court should evaluate this instruction to prevent
overreach in charging fraud schemes.
C. The instructions contained a legally erroneous theory.
The Emperor program, as a matter of law, cannot be a pyramid scheme.
Because the Government submitted an erroneous legal theory to the jury, the Court
should agree to a rehearing. See Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59. When “jurors have been left
the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that
their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error,” so the Court
should reverse the conviction. Id. at 59; Maike, 142 F.4th at 379. The Concurrence
12
also acknowledges that a MLM with a capped number of participants likely cannot
be a pyramid scheme as a matter of law. Id. at 389.
Despite these acknowledgements, the Concurrence focused on the
Government’s tangential contention that I2G as a whole was a pyramid scheme. But
the issue at trial was whether the Emperor program was a pyramid scheme.
The jury instructions limited the relevant scheme to the Emperor program.
(R.554,#5263-68.) That is how the Government defined the conspiracy in its
proposed jury instructions two weeks before trial. (R.420.) The Government claimed
the Emperor program was a pyramid scheme. (See id.;R.405,#3087;R.692,#9990.)
All the overt acts dealt with Emperor purchases. (R.554,#5263-64.) The defense at
trial and Defendants’ closing arguments focused on the claim that the Emperor
program was a pyramid scheme. (R. 671,#7618;R.476,#3631.)
The fact that the instruction permitted the jury to find that the Emperor
program was a pyramid scheme (in addition to the other legal errors set forth above)
was devastating to Hosseinipour. A pyramid scheme is inherently fraudulent because
it will inevitably fail because of saturation; it can only survive so long as recruiting
new members continues and eventually there will be no one left to recruit. The
Emperor program was not doomed to fail because of saturation concerns. Rather, the
program was capped at 5,000, and participants were entitled to earn a share of profits
from the online casino (along with revenue from other products). The 5,000 cap
13
ensured that the casino profits would not continue to be diluted. The success of the
Emperor program was dependent on the success of casino; no one was deceived into
believing she could continue to profit from recruiting. Everyone knew the Emperor
sales will end at 5,000. Because the jury was permitted to convict on an errant legal
theory, the full Court should consider the matter.
II. The panel failed to apply Glossip to the Napue argument.
After oral argument, the Supreme Court decided Glossip, which addressed the
proper standard to apply to a Napue argument. “To establish a Napue violation, a
defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited or allowed false
testimony to go uncorrected.” Glossip, 145 S. Ct. at 614.
If the defendant makes that showing, a new trial is warranted so long as
the false testimony may have had an effect on the outcome of the
trial,—that is, if it in any reasonable likelihood [could] have
affected the judgment of the jury….In effect, this materiality standard
requires the beneficiary of [the] constitutional error to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained.
Id. at 626-27 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; brackets in original).
The ability to cross examine does not cure a Napue violation. “The Due Process
Clause imposes ‘the responsibility and duty to correct’ false testimony on [the
prosecution] not on defense counsel.” Glossip, 145 S. Ct. at 630 (quoting Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959)). The panel failed to apply this standard.
14
Hosseinipour showed that the Government knowingly submitted and failed to
correct false evidence. Keep, the Government’s pyramid scheme expert, Agent
Sauber, and Jerry Reynolds all testified falsely. Reynolds provided the Government
with financial information early in its investigation. Years later, prior to trial, the
Government subpoenaed 101i and specified the information it wanted.
(R.498,#4217.) The Government sent “specific” subpoenas for “specific
documents.” (R.681,#8324-25.) The Government met with Reynolds on June 22,

2022. (Id.) The next day, Reynolds created 101i. (101i properties showing creation
      date of June 23, 2022.) By sending a “specific” subpoena for a “specific document,”
      the Government was able to have Reynolds exclude earned commissions from 101i.
      (R.721-2,#11428-30.) The omission of this data significantly skewed the
      spreadsheets presented to the jury.
      The purpose of 101i was to show the IBOs who earned more than they paid
      to I2G and the IBOs who paid more to I2G than they earned. In other words, 101i
      showed the participants with a net gain and the participants with a net loss. 101i
      indicated that 96% of the IBOS lost money, and this statistic was heavily relied on
      by the Government at trial.
      After trial, Reynolds signed an affidavit that described the Emperor data from
      his system that was omitted from 101i. (R.721-2,#11430; Ex.3 to R.721-2.) 101i
      listed 23,770 purchasers and indicated that 21,781 of those purchasers never
      15
      received a payment from I2G. According to 101i, approximately 2,000 IBOs,
      including 579 Emperors, earned commissions.
      In his affidavit, Reynolds explained he had the ability to run a report showing
      all commissions earned as tracked by his system, and he specifically ran a report for
      commission earned by all Emperors. (R.721-2,#11430.) That report showed that
      more than 3,300 Emperors received money from I2G. (Ex.3 to R.721-2.) Because of
      the Government’s directive, 101i failed to list approximately 2,700 Emperors who
      earned money from I2G. For Emperor and non-Emperors, over $25 million in earned
      commissions were excluded from 101i despite being tracked by Reynolds’ system.
      (Compare US-101i with US-7240.) 101i grossly altered the real financial results of
      I2G IBOs.
      Reynolds also testified falsely about 101i. In its briefing, the Government
      argued that Reynolds informed the jury of 101i’s deficiencies, which were a result
      of deficiencies in Reynolds’ system. (Gov.Br.56.) The panel repeated this. United
      States v. Maike, No. 22-6114, 2025 WL 1770555, at *6 (6th Cir. June 26, 2025).
      But as Reynolds’ affidavit makes clear, Reynolds’ system tracked
      substantially more commissions than what was included in 101i, and the jury never
      heard this information. (R.721-2,#11430;Ex.3 to R.721-2.) Despite this, Reynolds
      falsely testified that it included “data on all the participants’ gains and loss” “that
      was tracked by [his] system.” (R.498,#4163-64.) Reynolds and Keep falsely testify
      16
      that 101i reflected to the difference between IBO payments in and payments out.
      (R.498;#4164;R.487,#3876). As the Government phrased it, “so that shows for every
      participant in the system how much they gained or lost?,” and Keep answered
      “[c]orrect.” (Id.). Keep testified that he sorted the 101i by “gains and losses” and
      determined that 96% of the “20-plus thousand accounts” lost money. (R.487,#3877.)
      The 96% loss figure was critical to the Government’s case. The panel’s
      opinion cited the loss rate twice. The Government relied on it in its opening and
      hammered it in closing. (R.485,#3735; R.671,#7691-92.) The district court referred
      to the data as “gold.” (R.681,#8324-25.) 101i, the loss rate, and other false evidence
      were referenced extensively. (R.485,#3735;R.487,#3876-78,3883,3975,3977-
      78;R.498,#4163-73;R.671,#7691-92;R.681,#8324-25;R.688,#9049;R.689,#9323;
      R.690,#9488-89;R.699,#10322;R.701,#10920.)
      Based on the Napue error, under Glossip, the Government must “establish
      harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.” The panel failed to apply this standard
      and rejected the argument for two reasons. First, the panel noted that Reynolds
      testified that 101i may not have included every payment that I2G made to
      participants. Reynolds’ actual testimony was that 101i showed “participants’ gain
      and loss data that was tracked by [his] system.” (R.498,#4164). This was false; 101i
      excluded over $25 million of commissions tracked by his system. (Compare US101i Column P with US-7240 Column J).
      17
      Second, the panel held that no due-process violation occurred because
      “defendants had ample opportunity to cross-examine both Keep and Reynolds about
      anything that the spreadsheets contained.” Maike, 2025 WL 1770555, at *6. But a
      Napue violation cannot be cured by cross-examination. Glossip, 145 S. Ct. at
      631n.10. Like in Glossip, the defense had no idea Reynolds excluded information
      from his system. Moreover, the defense asked Reynolds about whether he had
      presented all the significant information he had about I2G, and he said to his
      knowledge he did. (R.498,#4177.) The prosecution had the duty to correct the false
      evidence, not the defense. Id. at 630.
      The panel failed to apply the materiality analysis set forth in Glossip.
      Materiality “always requires courts to assess whether []the error complained of[]
      could have contributed to the verdict….Here, the prosecutor’s failure to
      correct…false testimony is the relevant error, so the Court asks whether a correction
      could have made a material difference.” Id at 631. The prosecution’s correction of
      the repeated reliance on Reynolds’ false data and related testimony would have made
      a material difference.
      18
      Respectfully submitted,
      /s/ R. Kenyon Meyer (w/ permission)
      R. Kenyon Meyer
      DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
      101 South Fifth Street, Suite 2500
      Louisville, KY 40202
      (502) 540-2300
      kenyon.meyer@dinsmore.com
      AND
      /s/ Philip E. Cecil
      Philip E. Cecil
      FULTZ MADDOX DICKENS PLC
      101 S. Fifth Street, 27th Floor
      Louisville, Kentucky 40202
      (502) 588-2000
      pcecil@fmdlegal.com
      Counsel for Petitioner Faraday
      Hosseinipour
      19
      CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
      I certify that the foregoing brief complies with Fed. R. App. P. 40(d)(3)(A)and
      Fed. R. App. 32(a)(5)&(6) because the countable portion thereof contains 3,866
      words and was typed in 14-point Times New Roman font.
      Respectfully submitted,
      /s/ Philip E. Cecil
      Philip E. Cecil
      Counsel for Faraday Hosseinipour
      CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
      I certify that on August 11, 2025, a copy of the foregoing brief was served
      upon opposing counsel by electronic filing.
      Respectfully submitted,
      /s/ Philip E. Cecil
      Philip E. Cecil
      Counsel for Faraday Hosseinipour

The Appeal Court applied an improper standard and overlooked or misunderstood Hosseinipour’s key argument on the misuse of Anzalone’s guilty plea and the lack of a limiting instruction.

Summary

The 6th Circuit and Supreme Court cases, such as Bruton v. United States, have emphasized that a defendant’s confession or plea agreement is so significant that a limiting instruction is inadequate when the defendant’s ability to cross-examine is compromised. 

“Co-defendant or co-conspirator guilty pleas are not admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” U.S. v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2010). “When a guilty plea or conviction is introduced into evidence, the district court is required to give a cautionary instruction to the effect that the jury may use the conviction or guilty plea only to determine the testifying witness’s credibility.” U.S. v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1996).

In the case of Hosseinipour, Anzalone’s guilty plea was explicitly used to establish her guilt as Anzalone’s partner, which was acknowledged (Doc 692#10022). His statements and actions were treated as synonymous to Hosseinipour’s as his “partner in this crime. “ The prejudice is highlighted in the panel opinion, which references acts or statements that applied only to Anzalone as evidence against Hosseinipour, despite a lack of supporting evidence.  The panel cites direct quotes from Hosseinipour’s videos that never occurred.  It attaches meanings to emails detached from the evidence. The “guilty plea” was similarly misused to infer Hosseinipour’s guilt, as his partner.  

First, the Court misapplied the more stringent plain error standard to Hosseinipour’s argument despite numerous independent objections to using the guilty plea and requests for the limiting instruction by all the defendants. (See Doc 678, 8162, 8163, 8028, 8029, 8164, 8165;  Doc 681 #8304, #8306; Doc 692 #9907) This included a direct request from Hosseinipour to be included in Barnes’ request for a limiting instruction.   (doc.692, #9907). 

The Court had ruled that an objection made by one party served as an objection for the parties. Therefore, Hosseinipour was preserved on the issues through her own and co-defendant’s multiple requests for a limiting instruction (See Doc 678, 8162, 8163, 8028, 8029, 8164, 8165;  Doc 681 #8304, #8306; Doc 692 #9907)

The panel overlooked or misunderstood Hosseinipour’s main argument concerning the critical misrepresentation of law that influenced the judgment of Anzalone’s “guilty plea” that mandated her finding of guilt. 

Hosseinipour argued that the incorrect legal instruction regarding the government’s burden to prove guilt—without the necessity of mens rea—by mere participation in I2G, if a pyramid scheme was concluded, in conjunction with Anzalone’s guilty plea, left the jury with no choice but to declare her guilty. This highlighted the importance of having a limiting instruction. 

In closing arguments, the government instructed the jury that Anzalone would be guilty without knowing that he was participating in a pyramid scheme (Doc 671 7689) and without mens rea if the jury concluded that a pyramid scheme existed and that he knowingly participated in I2G.  (Doc 671 #7530)  

“ And if you find that what Infinity 2 Global was was a pyramid scheme, then you have found that the United States has satisfied the first element of Count 1, that they were knowingly promoting a –”

Over objections, the Court acknowledged the error of law and explained the omission of the “knowingly” element to the prosecution, not the jury. Nor did the Court strike the improper instruction.  The Court then allowed the prosecution to repeat the same erroneous misstatement of law. (doc 671 #7531, 32)

“And so if you believe that Infinity 2 Global was a pyramid scheme, that the primary purpose or nature of the business was to pull in these — to recruit people to join the business, then you will have found that a scheme to defraud existed. A pyramid scheme is, by definition under the law, a scheme to defraud.”(doc 671-7331, 32)

The legal instruction was erroneous. It suggested that anyone involved in I2G or any multi-level marketing (MLM) that requires recruiting—a fundamental aspect of every MLM—was guilty of conspiracy without criminal intent. The instruction also equated a focus on recruiting to a scheme to defraud under the law, based solely on regulatory guidance from Section 5(a) of the FTC Act rather than the penal code, as suggested. 

Because the jury’s understanding of these legal arguments was directly related to the judgment of Anzalone’s guilty plea and correlated finding of guilt for Hosseinipour, a limiting instruction was crucial in this scenario.

Moreover, the jury was instructed that Anzalone was guilty by his mere “participation” without the requirement of mens rea if they concluded that it was a pyramid scheme.  Combined with Anzalone’s guilty plea, this instruction required a guilty verdict for Hosseinipour or any I2G distributor participant.  

The improper instructions assigned guilt to “unknowing participation” in a pyramid scheme. This significant issue could affect millions of distributors in the United States, as their mere participation in a multi-level marketing (MLM) program—potentially classified as a pyramid scheme based on subjective and inconsistent regulatory guidance—might wrongfully lead to federal fraud charges. The significance of these rulings cannot be overstated.

 While any instruction that omits the requirement of mens rea from a criminal offense is problematic, the jury was instructed to disregard mens rea and determine guilt based on legal “participation” if they found a pyramid scheme.  Therefore, the  Anzalone “guilty plea” automatically concluded Hosseinipour’s guilt if a pyramid was concluded.  This broad instruction would similarly criminalize the legal “participation” of all 18,000 distributors who knowingly participated in I2G.

The consequences are monumental for the 20 million distributors in the United States alone who participate in an MLM, which may be deemed a pyramid scheme based on subjective determinations of what constitutes an excessive focus on recruiting, inferior products, or other regulatory conclusions drawn from the overly broad definitions and instructions. 

Since distributor participation in a multi-level marketing (MLM) company identified as a pyramid scheme had never been prosecuted as a criminal offense, nor in the civil regulatory context Congress specifically intended for pyramid schemes to be judged under Section 5A of the FTC Act—the misuse of Anzalone’s guilty plea against Hosseinipour carries significant implications and consequences that extend far beyond this case. (Congressional and Senate anti-pyramid law of 2017,2018, citing intended judgments of pyramid schemes to be viewed under the 5 A of the FTC Act as an unfair business practice)

Anzalone’s explanation of the law, as explained by his attorney, reinforced the improper conclusion of law by affirming it as the reason he accepted his plea deal.   He shared that his “great attorney,” Patrick, explained the law to him. “Ignorance of the law doesn’t make me not guilty.” This reinforced the notion by a legal authority that mens rea was not required to determine guilt in the specific case of “participating in a pyramid scheme”. Therefore, if Anzalone was guilty, despite ignorance that his participation was breaking the law,  and Hosseinipour participated, she must also be found guilty. 

 Hosseinipour was most adversely affected by Anzalone’s guilty plea as his actions and knowledge were viewed as synonymous with hers due to their partnership. This prejudice is highlighted by the panel’s opinion, which likewise attributes Anzalone’s actions to Hosseinipour, despite the absence of supporting evidence and direct evidence to the contrary. 

For example, the panel claimed that Hosseinipour promoted “passive income” at live meetings. It cited her influence on Maike as a member of the “inner circle,” despite direct testimony that Maike excluded her from conversations and meetings (doc 465 #3579) and failed to acknowledge her in emails unless he copied her and his wife (doc 504 #4372). Hosseinipour was said to have held up the incorrect check at an Asian event she never attended (doc 504 #4454, #4372). It was further inferred that she knew Rocky Wright and that he was introduced as Bob Johnson. This evidence related only to Anzalone but was cited as proof of Hosseinipour’s guilt. 

 The panel also offered direct quotes from Hosseinipour on videos promoting “passive income” with no work required, which do not exist.  Instead, the video clips from the trial offered “income disclaimers,” emphasizing the requirement of hard work (487 3883). 3884). Five government videos and four witness testimonies confirmed her consistent use of income disclosures and emphasis on the hard work required to succeed with I2G.  

While the standard of “most favorable” to the government should generally apply, it cannot override the use of false evidence in the government’s response. False quotes from videos that do not exist were presented as direct proof of guilt. The Appeal panel relied on these inaccuracies to deny her argument. Supreme Court authority regarding the knowing use of false evidence must take precedence over the standard favoring the government in this situation.

The sole reference to “passive income” related to Hosseinipour came from an unverified “description” under an unverified video, which was so dubious that the Court did not allow its introduction. (Doc 683 #8748-8752)  Yet the government introduced it as a direct quote by Hosseinipour, despite the same witness testimony that her videos always provided income disclosures and emphasized that hard work was necessary to earn any income. (Doc 683 #8748)

The panel’s opinion underscores the prejudice from Anzalone’s guilty plea as it attributes his personal beliefs, statements, and actions to her, for which there is no supporting evidence.  

Moreover, a conclusion regarding Hosseinipour’s guilt cannot be separated from Anzalone’s guilty plea. Their actions were viewed jointly, making it difficult to view them independently. The prejudicial inferences stemming from their partnership were significant, and this equally applies to Anzalone’s guilty plea, especially in the absence of a limiting instruction.