Six of the 6th Circuit Court judges acknowledged a substantial legal issue related to Hosseinipour’s ineffective assistance of counsel. One three-judge panel ordered her release from prison pending appeal based on this issue. It cited an abuse of discretion by the District Court “for its failure to hold an evidentiary hearing and its denial of her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on its merits, given the number and severity of counsel’s alleged deficiencies and corroboration by multiple affidavits.” The panel noted the District Court’s unflattering assessment of counsel’s performance.
The 6th Circuit Release Order cites the “concerning pattern of behhavior” such as advising Hosseinipour to reject a plea offer because it would be perjury to plead guilty when she believed she was innocent; failing to inform Hosseinipour or the government about the other expressed interest in additional plea negotiations; refusing to file a motion to sever when Hosseinipour asked him to, which left her as the only low-level participant tried alongside I2G’s ringleaders; not reviewing Hosseinipour’s statement to a federal agent until after the agent testified; and even refusing to inform the court that Hosseinipour had fired him, telling co-defendants’ counsel but continuing to participate in the trial. Hosseinipour’s husband submitted an affidavit that corroborated his wife’s description of counsel’s representation, which is notable because counsel is his brother. Counsel himself submitted an affidavit confirming that, at the time of trial, he had very little experience with criminal representations or jury trials; no experience with federal prosecutions, criminal proffer agreements, complex e-discovery, or government investigations; and that he was not even subscribed to a legal research service. Despite the corroboration of her husband and counsel, and despite its own uncomplimentary statements about counsel’s performance, the district court summarily rejected Hosseinipour’s affidavit as self-serving and denied the motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. Based on our review of the record, however, we believe that Hosseinipour has raised a substantial issue regarding the district court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing and its denial of her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on its merits, given the number and severity of counsel’s alleged deficiencies and corroboration by multiple affidavits”.
A second Sixth Circuit panel recognized “substantial evidence of ineffective assistance” during oral arguments. Honorable Judge Kethledge stated twice that Hosseinipour presented “substantial evidence of ineffective assistance,” which was “frankly evident in the transcripts.” Judge McKeague lamented, “Even if we think he’s the worst ever,”
Although the panel acknowledged Hosseinipour’s strong evidence of ineffective assistance, its opinion, issued on June 26, 2025, contradicted this finding and the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment guarantee to an individual defense.
Both 6th Circuit panels agreed that the District Court’s decision to deny Hosseinipour a new trial or an evidentiary hearing constituted an abuse of discretion. The latter panel vacated the order based on a legal error and ignored the substantial proof of her ineffective counsel previously acknowledged.
The panel concluded that despite her ineffective assistance, Hosseinipour was not prejudiced due to receiving a “defense by proxy” through her co-defendants’ counsel. This unsupportable legal conclusion assumes that she is the same as her co-defendants and fails to recognize her right to an individual defense under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.
The latter panel’s opinion also contradicts the former panel’s implied conclusion that Hosseinipour was prejudiced for the same reason: being connected to the co-defendant’s defense as “the only low-level participant tried alongside the company’s ringleaders.”
The 6th Amendment does not forfeit Hosseinipour’s right to an individual defense by limiting her to the defense of dissimilar co-defendants, irrespective of their effective counsel.
Hosseinipour was an “individual ibo who joined like other ibos.” As such, her role significantly differed from that of the owners. Her distributor role was identical to that of the alleged victims. Like thousands of others, she was recruited, promoted the I2G business with the same company PowerPoint presentation, and relied on the exact representations. Like others, she could not access the company’s bank accounts, data, or records. The District Court declared “She was less of a leader than a cheerleader” who “exuded personality and enthusiasm” and “the one who was always helping everyone, whether it benefited her or not”. Doc 675 #7826 7827
Court : “Here’s my impression — and we sat through all of this testimony — was that she was less of a leader than a cheerleader. “She was very animated, very — she exuded personality and enthusiasm. That didn’t make her a leader. It didn’t make her a manager..other than providing assistance to others- in terms of how I understand it, “Oh, yes, Ms. Hosseinipour, she helped everybody.” And she was very active in helping.”
The 6th Amendment of the Constitution entitled Hosseinipour to an individual defense, not a forced “shared” one with the owners by default. The panel incorrectly assumed that her only defense must be aligned with that of the owners, which ultimately prejudiced her case.
Despite acknowledging clear evidence of ineffective assistance—including a lack of knowledge regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence, how to make objections, what constituted hearsay, (doc 691 #9878, Doc 678 #8016), what constituted a security or pyramid scheme (doc 692 #9967, Doc 691#9766), knowing a single law related to the issue (doc 683 #8589), the purpose of cross-examination, knowing that evidence against a co-conspirator could be used against his client or that he could object to evidence unrelated to his client, or that issues needed to be preserved for appeal (Doc 671 #7482, 83), —the panel wrongly concluded that the co-defendant’s defense mitigated any prejudice resulting from her ineffective assistance and the denial of an individual defense.
Hosseinipour shared appeal arguments by necessity with her co-defendants due to her counsel’s lack of knowledge to preserve issues. She was therefore limited to those preserved by her co-defendants, based on the Court ruling that an objection raised by one applies to all.
However, no legal support exists that a co-defendant’s defense can satisfy the Constitutional right to an individual defense. The co-defendants’ attorneys focused on their clients’ interests and did not advocate for hers. For example, they failed to file any motions to exclude, object to, or challenge evidence related to Hosseinipour, such as the introduction of her videos, emails, commission records, or statements by Anzalone. Nor did they follow up on positive remarks. The perception of a joint defense with the owners prejudiced her further by creating the appearance that she held a more significant role.
Supplemental
The court assumed she must be part of upper management simply because she was present. It cannot be argued that Hosseinipour was not prejudiced by her co-defendant’s defense, which ultimately undermined any individual defense of her own.
At the oral arguments on December 11, 2024, Honorable Judge Kethledge repeatedly stated that Hosseinipour presented “substantial evidence of ineffective assistance, which was frankly evident from the transcripts.” He drilled the government as to whether they believed it was an abuse of discretion for the Court to deny Hosseinipour’s request for an evidentiary hearing. To which he responded, “Really Is that where we are at? You don’t think it’s an abuse of discretion when someone could be sent to prison that may not belong there? Judge McKeague cited the concern that “even if we think he’s awful,” what the implications on the Circuit might be to granting a new trial based on an ineffective assistance claim.
On June 26, 2025, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s original motion for a new trial and remanded the case to the District Court to be decided anew. It noted that the denial was based on a legal error, citing incorrect facts, and did not address the ineffective assistance.
Despite Honorable Judge Kethledge’s acknowledgment of “substantial evidence” of ineffective assistance, the three-judge panel did not vacate her conviction and order a new trial. Instead, it ruled she was not prejudiced because her co-defendant’s attorneys offered her a defense by proxy.